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1. Introduction 
The main instruments of intellectual property policy to promote innovations are the 
legal protection of patents and the legal protection of commercial and industrial secrets. As 
Friedman, Landes and Posner (1991) point out, trade secret law supplements the patent 
system as “Inventors choose trade secret protection when they believe that patent 
protection is too costly relative to the value of their invention, or that it will give them a 
reward substantially less than the benefit of their invention…, either because the invention 
is not patentable or because the length (or other conditions) of patent protection is 
insufficient”. According to the authors, trade secret law is confined to protecting against 
conduct that is independently wrongful, that is, that violates some independent common 
law principle. Both reverse engineering and independent reinvention are admissible, as 
they often generate knowledge that will make it possible to improve on the original 
product. Besides, as trade secret protection has virtually no expiration date, the prohibition 
of reverse engineering and independent invention would make it stronger and preferable to 
patents. Nevertheless, citing a case like E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher and 
considering that in assessing damages courts take account of trade secret’s commercial 
value, the authors recognize the statement that there is no law of trade secrets as too bold. 
Since patents and trade secrets have generally been perceived as mutually exclusive, 
with few exception the law and economics literature has separately concentrated on the 
design of optimal patent policy and on the design of optimal trade secret policy.1 However, 
while the interest in optimal patent design is long standing and has given rise to large 
                                                 
1 In some papers the choice between patent and trade secret protection is explicitly considered, but 
the strength of trade secret protection is treated as exogenous (e.g., Gallini, 1992; Denicolò and 
Franzoni, 2008; Cugno and Ottoz, 2006). For a discussion regarding the interplay between optimal 
patent and trade secret protection, see Erkal (2004). 
 3
literature in the field, whose origins can be dated back to Nordhaus (1969),2 the issue of the 
optimal strength of trade secret protection has received little attention until a short time 
ago. Only recently, starting from a provocative paper by Bone (1998), some authors have 
widely discussed the question of whether trade secret deserves a legal protection which 
goes beyond the contract law or the tort law. In the words of Lemley (2008), “Trade secret 
law is a puzzle. Courts and scholars have struggled for over a century to figure out why we 
protect trade secrets. …It seems odd, though, for the law to encourage secrets …..I argue 
that, paradoxically, trade secret law actually encourages disclosure, not secrecy. Without 
legal protection, companies in certain industries would invest too much in keeping 
secrets.” Trade secret laws are then justified by the economic benefits that flow from their 
existence, in particular incentives for innovators to spend less money protecting secret 
information and for imitators attempting to appropriate secret information. According to 
Risch (2007) and Lemley (2008), the reduction of such costs is a sufficient reason for the 
existence of a trade secret law as a separate doctrine, whereas Bone (1998) has an opposite 
opinion. 
The papers cited above prevalently refer to cases in which a proprietary innovation is 
protected by trade secret only. However, in spite of a common misperception of an 
alternative between patents and trade secrets, an innovator can use both intellectual 
property rights to protect different aspects of the same invention, as courts have long held 
that a published patent does not invalidate those trade secrets that are not disclosed in the 
patent itself.3 Trade secrets can, in fact, be used in lieu of patents but, more importantly, 
                                                 
2 A selection of the first contributions includes Tandon (1982), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), 
Klemperer (1990), Gallini (1992). 
3 Interesting examples of patent-secret mix reported by Arora (1997) include German organic 
dyestuff in the nineteenth century, the Haber Bosch process for producing ammonia, the industrial 
diamond process technology by General Electric in the fifties. Court decisions such as C&F 
Packing v. IBP and Pizza Hut (Fed. Cir. 2000) illustrated by Jorda (2004) and Celeritas 
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they can be relied upon at the same time and side by side with patents to protect any given 
invention. With patents and trade secrets it is clearly possible to cover additional subject 
matter, strengthen exclusivity and extend intellectual property rights. 
As patent protection is meant to assure the innovator with a reward just sufficient to 
cover her costs, it is clear that the association of patents and trade secrets can result in an 
over-reward of the innovator well beyond the one necessary to preserve the innovation 
incentive. Thus, a relevant policy issues arises. If the policy makers worry about the 
negative effects of a patent length reduction on the research incentive for innovations 
whose components are all protectable only by patents, do social benefits result from a 
decrease in trade secret protection, given the patent length, when the owner of the patent-
secret mix is over-rewarded? 
In this paper we attempt to face this issue by using a model in which the social cost 
associated with the mixtures of patents and trade secrets includes, besides dead-weight 
losses, the costs borne by an entrant trying to duplicate that part of the technology 
protected by trade secret. Leaving aside, for sake of simplicity, costs borne by the two 
firms to illicitly obtain or protect information, we can concentrate on the relations between 
duplication costs (by legal means) and social welfare, along the lines of previous models 
present in the literature (Gallini, 1992; Maurer and Scotchmer, 2002; Denicolò and 
Franzoni, 2008).4 A special feature of our model is nevertheless the relation between the 
probability of duplication and the scope of trade secret law. 
                                                                                                                                       
Technologies v. Rockwell International (Fed. Cir. 1998) provide more recent examples of a 
complementary use of patents and trade secrets. Moreover, it is well known that in the software 
industry source code secrecy frequently complements patents. 
4 Accurate analyses of the relation between costs incurred by rival firms in order to protect or 
misappropriate secret information and the scope of trade secret law can be found in the cited papers 
by Bone, (1998), Risch, (2007), and Lemley (2008). 
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Considering a situation in which transaction costs of trade secret licensing are 
prohibitive, we determine conditions under which a strong legal protection of trade secret 
is socially beneficial even if it implies innovator’s over-rewarding. The paper is organized 
as follows. In Section 2 the model is presented and some legal issues are briefly discussed. 
Section 3 is dedicated to the design of optimal secret protection when secrets complement 
patents and Section 4 concludes. 
2. Employee Mobility, Knowledge Spillover, and Duplication Costs 
The model we will put forward in Subsection 2.2 below refers to a duopoly 
environment where employee mobility is subject to some contractual and legal restrictions 
intended to limit spillovers of proprietary non patented information. The scope of trade 
secret protection is identified with the strength of these restrictions, which we shortly 
expound in the following subsection. 
2.1. Labor Mobility Restrictions 
Apart form clearly illegal means for appropriating secret information, such as 
industrial espionage, employee mobility seems to be the main cause of technology 
spillovers between firms.5 To the purpose of limiting harmful losses of proprietary 
information, in employment contracts firms may insert post-employment clauses, known 
as “post-employment covenants not to compete”. In the absence of these covenants, in 
some cases firms may still resort to a lawsuit by appealing to the “inevitable disclosure 
doctrine” or similar arguments. The scope of trade secret law largely depends on the 
degree of jurisdictions’ acceptance (and enforcement) of these protection tools. 
While post-employment covenants consist of promises by employees not to work for a 
competitor for a specified period after employment ends, the inevitable disclosure doctrine 
                                                 
5 With reference to high technology districts see, for example, Saxenian (1994) and Gilson (1999).  
 6
refers to cases in which such covenants are not signed in the hiring contracts or during the 
employment relationships. This legal doctrine assumes that if an employee has knowledge 
of trade secrets, and accepts a similar job with a direct competitor in a highly competitive 
firm, he or she will “inevitably” disclose the trade secrets in the course of performing his 
or her new employment duties, so that when the former employer would suffer “irreparable 
harm” from disclosure this sort of employee mobility should be restricted irrespective of 
the existence of post-employment covenants. Classical cases where the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine has been adopted are PepsiCo., Inc. v. Redmond (7th Cir. 1995) 54 F.3d 
1262 and IBM v. Papermaster, 2008 WL 4974508 (S.D.N.Y.), where the notion of 
“irreparable harm” is introduced. An example of rejection is Schlage Lock Company v. 
Whyte (2002) 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443. 
It is worth noting that while enforceability of post-employment covenants not to 
compete are provided for by the law in almost all U.S. and E.U. jurisdictions, with more or 
less differences and with the notable exception of California where they are banned, the 
adoption of inevitable disclosure doctrine is typical of several, but not all, U.S. courts. 
Besides California, where the doctrine is explicitly refused, some jurisdictions such as 
Michigan, Missouri, Maryland and Minnesota expressed a few reservations about its 
application. Despite European courts never refer to some form of inevitable disclosure 
doctrine, something similar has nevertheless been formulated by the Court of Appeals of 
Paris in a case reported by Thiébart (2003), where the employee did not signed any post-
employment restrictive clause. In its decision rendered on November 10, 1994, the court 
ruled that “if it is legitimate, in all cases, that an employee harvest the fruit of the 
experience he gained with prior employers, which constitutes for the employee a normal 
factor of enhanced value, this does not justify unfair behavior which can consist in 
disorganizing a former employer by massive employee departure or in disclosing 
manufacturing secrets and technical or commercial knowledge in order to enable the latter 
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to capture the clients of the former employer”. In any case, it is obvious that where the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine, or some equivalent argument, is adopted, the scope of trade 
secret law tends to be broader than elsewhere.  
The differences in conditions for enforceability of post-employment covenants mainly 
concern geographical and temporal restrictions, employees’ job positions with respect to 
access to trade secrets, and employee financial compensations. For example, financial 
compensation to the employee must be explicitly provided for in employment contracts 
(personal or collective) in almost all E.U. states, while other jurisdictions −notably, the 
overwhelming majority of states in the U.S., Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and, inside 
E.U., Great Britain− do not require special consideration in labor contracts for worker’s 
agreement to a non competition covenant. As far as California is concerned, Business and 
Professions Code section 16600 provides that “every contract by which anyone is 
restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that 
extent void.” Californian courts have interpreted section 16600 “as broadly as its language 
reads”,6 so that they not only reject the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, but they also 
refuse to enforce post-employment covenants. See Gilson (1999), where the high labor 
turnover in Silicon Valley is ascribed to the weakness of trade secret protection in 
California, in contrast with the low employee mobility in Route 128 district governed by 
Massachusetts trade secret law. 
2.2. The Model 
Let’s consider two firms, labeled I  (incumbent) and E  (entrant). Firm I  owns a 
proprietary product jointly protected by patents, whose duration is t , and trade secrets, 
                                                 
6 Scott v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc. 732 F. Supp. 1034, 1042 (N.D. Cal 1990). 
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which have no fixed expiration date.7 For example, we can assume that at the time the 
patent was filed firm I  disclosed the best mode for carrying out the invention; 
successively, firm I  discovers a better best mode which it can keep secret without bearing 
the risk of patent invalidation. A possible alternative hypothesis is that the proprietary 
product consists of several parts, some of which are patented while others are kept secret. 
In any case, at the time t  firm E  attempts to duplicate the secret information by spending 
resources at this aim. It may enter the market bearing the same production costs of firm I , 
if duplication is successful, or higher costs −those associated with the information 
disclosed in the patent− if the duplication attempt fails.8 
We assume that each employee of the incumbent firm has only a piece, more or less 
important, of information on the whole set of secrets owned by his or her employer. To the 
purpose of duplicating the secret parts of firm s'I  technology, firm E  may take advantage 
of some knowledge spillover, whose intensity essentially depends on the employee 
mobility between the two firms. Employee mobility in turn depends on the scope of trade 
secret law, more specifically on the enforceability of post-employment covenants not to 
compete, and on the adoption or rejection by courts of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (in 
the U.S.) or similar legal arguments. 
By utilizing the set of information obtained through employee mobility, whatever its 
dimension, at time t  firm E  will spend resources to duplicate all components of firm s'I  
                                                 
7 Although an innovator can often choose the extent patents and trade secrets combine with one 
another, in this paper we assume a given patent-secret mix. For a model where the patent-secret mix 
results from a maximizing choice, see Ottoz and Cugno (2008). 
8 Patents are assumed to be broad enough to make any non-infringing imitation impossible. This 
hypothesis is harmless to our purposes, as the introduction of patent breadth as a control instrument 
responsible of the possibility of patent imitation and related costs, would not modify conclusions. In 
particular, in our model a patent guaranteeing temporary monopoly would still be optimal, as in 
Gallini (1992). 
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technology protected by trade secret. Given the sum spent for duplication, called K , the 
probability of success, γ , will increase with the dimension of the preexisting set of 
disposable information, which in turn diminishes as the scope of trade secret law increases. 
In what follows, for sake of simplicity we treat the scope of trade secret law as a 
continuous variable depending on the conditions required by the relevant courts for 
enforcing post-employment covenants or applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine. 
 On these bases, and adopting the usual convexity hypothesis for a cost function, we 
assume that the probability of duplication success, the duplication effort, and the scope of 
trade secret law, are linked by the relation 
)(γθgK = ,      (1) 
where 0=0)(g , 0>)(' γg , 0>)('' γg  and the shift parameter θ  is a measure of the 
duplication difficulty which increases as the scope of trade secret law is broadened. Note 
that this approach is very similar to the one adopted by Takalo (2004) in a model with 
costly patent imitation: the only difference is that in our case the duplication difficulty 
depends on the strength of trade secret protection, not on patent breadth. 
If the attempt is successful, from time t  firm E  will compete on the same 
technological footing with firm I , so that it will obtain for ever a stream of symmetric-cost 
duopoly profits equal to ESDπ . If the attempt fails, firm E  may enter the market with a 
production cost associated with the information disclosed in the patent application, that is 
with higher costs than firm I . In this case firm E  will gain a stream of asymmetric-cost 
profits ESDEAD ππ <≤0 . Given that r  represents the discount rate, firm E  will then choose 
γ  by maximizing 
)(
)( γθπγγπ g
r
E
AD
E
SDE −−1+=Π .    (2) 
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If an interior solution 1<<0 γ  exists, the privately optimal value of γ  will be given 
by 
θ
ππγ
r
g
E
AD
E
SD −=)(' ,     (3) 
from which 
θγ
γ
θγ
ππ
θ
γ
)(''
)('
)('' g
g
rgd
d EADESD −=−−= 2 .    (4) 
So, as it was logical to expect, an increase in the scope of trade secret law reduces the 
privately optimal level of γ . 
3. Choosing the Scope of Trade Secret Law 
In this section we first use our simple duopoly model to determine the optimal scope of 
trade secret law for a given patent length. In doing this we assume that, due to high 
transaction costs, trade secret licensing is not mutually convenient. Then we consider some 
special cases characterized by different market behaviors. 
3.1. Optimal Scope 
Let’s indicate with MΔ  the stream of dead-weight loss associated with monopoly, with 
SDΔ  the stream associated with symmetric-cost duopoly, and with ADΔ  the stream 
associated with asymmetric-cost duopoly. With probability γ−1  firm E  is not successful 
in the duplication attempt so that after patent expiration firm I  will enjoy a production 
cost advantage. In this case the stream of dead-weight loss will be MΔ  during patent life 
and MAD Δ≤Δ  soon after the expiration date. If, on the opposite, firm E  is successful in 
the duplication attempt, after patent expiration the stream of deadweight loss will be 
ADSD Δ<Δ . This event has probability γ . Social expected cost of the patent-secret mix, 
SC , is the sum of the expected present value of dead-weight losses and of the expected 
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present value of the cost borne by firm E  to duplicate the secret, minus the present value 
of the perpetual flow of dead-weight losses associated to the symmetric-cost duopoly 
(which is not dependent on the patent-secret mix). Then, defining rteT −−1= , 
r
g
r
T
r
TSC SDADSDM Δ−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +Δ−1+Δ−1+Δ= )()()( γθγγ ,  (5) 
where MADSD Δ≤Δ<Δ .  
Minimizing SC  with respect to θ  and T  while preserving the desired innovation 
incentive, we in general can determine the socially optimal combination of patent length 
and trade secret scope for innovations of the kind we are dealing with. As the choice of 
patent length is, nevertheless, relevant also for innovations whose components are all 
protectable only by patents, may be that policy makers wish to fix it at a level higher than 
that which would solve the above problem. Let’s then consider the case where at the outset 
T  and θ  are such that the innovator is over-rewarded. The problem is to verify if a 
reduction in the scope of trade secret law, diminishing the over-reward of the innovator for 
the given T , also reduces the social cost of the patent-secret mix. Proposition 1 below 
shows that under certain conditions the opposite happens. 
Before proceeding, it is useful to define the elasticity of probability of firm s'E  
duplication success with respect to the expense for duplication. As we will see, this 
elasticity, given by γγγγγη )('/)()/)(/( ggKdKd == , will turn to be crucial for our 
result. 
Proposition 1. Suppose the inequality 
E
AD
E
SD
SDAD
d
d
ππγγ
ηη −
Δ−Δ>+      (6)  
holds for all ],[ maxmin γγγ ∈ , where minγ  and maxγ  are the probabilities of duplication 
success corresponding to the maximum and minimum scope of trade secrete law, 
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respectively. Then, the maximum scope of trade secret law turns out to be socially optimal 
despite the patent-secret holder is over rewarded. 
Proof. By using equations (3), (4) and (5) we can verify that if 
E
AD
E
SD
SDAD
g
ggg
ππγ
γγγ
−
Δ−Δ>− 2
2
))('(
)('')())('(     (7) 
the derivative θddSC /  is negative. (See the Appendix for details.) On the other hand, 
differentiating γγγη )('/)( gg=  and rearranging terms, we have 
γγ
ηηγ
γγγ
d
d
g
ggg +=− 2
2
))('(
)('')())('( .    (8) 
Thus, inequality (7) corresponds to inequality (6). The enunciate immediately follows. ■ 
The rationale of Propositions 1 is that when condition (6) holds an increase in the 
scope of trade secret law increases expected innovator’s profits more than it decreases the 
expected value of consumer surplus net of duplication costs, so that social welfare 
increases. In other words the beneficial effect of a high legal protection of trade secret is 
due to the fact that this sort of protection allows society to save on duplication costs that 
would be otherwise borne by firm E . This saving may be sufficient to more than 
compensate the increase of the expected present value of dead-weight losses caused by the 
reduction of the probability that the duplication attempt is successful. 
It is worthwhile noticing that the hypotheses we have formulated on the relation 
between γ , K  and θ  are crucial for the above result. Other models assume that the 
probability of success in duplicating the secret technology is equal to 1 provided that the 
entrant invests a given amount of resources for that purpose and that there exists a positive 
probability (obviously smaller than 1) of total leakage of the secret. (See Denicolò and 
Franzoni, 2008; see also Gallini, 1992, where the duplication cost of the secret doesn’t play 
any role, but there is a probability of total leakage and a probability equal to 1 of non 
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infringing patent imitation if the imitator invests for that goal a sufficient sum.) In these 
circumstances, if the probability of total leakage is negatively affected by the scope of 
trade secret law, it would be always optimal to adopt a policy of minimum trade secret 
protection. In fact, as duplication expenses do not depend on policy makers’ choices, it 
would be advisable to get the maximum probability of total leakage. 
Remark 1. If the quantity γγηη )/( dd+  monotonically decreases with γ  increasing, 
the maximum scope of trade secret law can be socially optimal even if inequality (6) is 
reversed in some subinterval of ],[ maxmin γγ . The reason is that when the graph of 
γγηη )/( dd+  with γ  increasing cuts the horizontal line )/()( EADESDSDAD ππ −Δ−Δ  from 
above, at the intersection point SC  is at a maximum. Then, if there are no other 
intersection points, SC  will be minimized either at minγ  or at maxγ . 
3.2. Some Special Cases 
To gain more insights into the meaning and relevance of condition (6) it is useful to 
consider different market behaviors under linear output demand and constant marginal 
costs. Assume therefore the inverse demand function QaP −= , where P  is market price 
and Q  is total output. Also assume that, with respect to the superior technology which 
allows to produce at constant marginal costs equal to zero, the inferior technology implies 
a constant cost disadvantage equal to ε .9 Under the above linearity assumptions and the 
additional hypothesis that the function )(γg  is iso-elastic ( 0=γη dd / ), condition (6) can 
be written 
                                                 
9 No loss of generality is implied by setting marginal costs associated with the superior technology 
equal to zero. If these costs were supposed positive, the demand function could simply be rescaled 
to produce the same results. 
 14
E
ADAD
E
SDSD
SD
E
ADAD
E
AD
E
SD
SDAD
qPqP
PqP
)(
))(/())(/(
ε
ε
ππη −−
21−+21=−
Δ−Δ>
22
,   (9) 
where Eiq , ADSDi ,= , stands for firm s'E  output.10 In what follows we will examine 
Cournot competition (integrated with limit pricing), Stackelberg competition with the 
incumbent firm acting as the quantity leader, Bertrand competition, collusion, and 
incumbent’s post-patent monopoly. In this way we can obtain approximate numeric 
information about the pairs ),( εη  for which, given the market behavior, condition (6) in 
Proposition 1 is fulfilled. 
• Cournot competition. Suppose 2=< /aPMε , where MP  stands for monopoly price. 
Under Cournot duopoly, where each firm chooses a quantity to produce that maximizes its 
profit flow given the expectation that the rival firm maintains its output level fixed, firm 
s'E  outputs and market prices are given by  
3=
aq ESD ,   3
2−= εaq EAD ,   3=
aPSD ,   3
+= εaPAD . 
Then, condition (9) becomes 
ε
εη 8−8
11−8>
a
a . 
Since the ratio )/()( εε 8−811−8 aa  decreases as ε  increases, approaching the value of 
85 /  as ε  tends to the point 2/a , at which and above the incumbent firm enjoys full 
monopoly power even after patent expiration, a necessary condition for inequality (9) to be 
satisfied is 85> /η . For 85> /η  inequality (9) can be fulfilled provided that ε  is 
                                                 
10 Since Pareto-optimal output is equal to a , deadweight-loss triangles are given by 
221=−21 ))(/()()/( iii PQaP , ADSDi ,= . When ADi = , we must add the total extra cost born 
by firm E , that is EADqε . 
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sufficiently high (see the shaded zone in Figure 1, panel i).11 In particular, this event is the 
more likely the more relevant is the secret part of technology in terms of production costs 
and the more productive is at the margin the expense for duplication, that is for high levels 
of ε  and η . This is due to the fact that for any θ  duplication becomes more attractive as 
ε  and η  increase, so that a strong trade secret protection permits the society to save 
resources whose amount exceeds the expected present value of dead-weight losses 
associated with no duplication. 
 
• Cournot competition and limit pricing. In considering the above kind of competition we 
have ignored that when firm E  fails in its duplication attempt the incumbent can prefer to 
deter entry by resorting to a limit pricing strategy, that is by setting the price at ε=ADP . 
Specifically, comparing the value of the incumbent’s profit flow under limit pricing with 
the corresponding value under asymmetric-cost Cournot duopoly, we can verify that limit 
                                                 
11 Note that the elasticity η  is upper bounded at 1  because the assumptions 0)('' >γg  and η  = 
constant are incompatible with 1≥η . 
Figure 1. Condition (9) under Cournot competition (panel i) and limit pricing 
(panel ii). 
2
a  ε
η  
1  
8
5  
i η
ε  
2
a  
1
5
a  
8
5  
3
a  
ii 
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pricing turns out to be a superior alternative for the incumbent if 2<<5 // aa ε .12 
Suppose then that the two firms compete à la Cournot when the entrant succeeds in 
duplicating the secret technology or, if it does not succeed, when 5< /aε . Otherwise, the 
incumbent adopts a limit pricing strategy, so that if the entrant firm fails the duplication 
attempt and ε<5/a , its output will be zero. Then, since for 2<<5 // aa ε  we have 
3=
aq ESD ,   0=EADq ,   3=
aPSD ,   ε=ADP ,  
while for 5< /aε  the results for Cournot competition hold, condition (9) becomes 
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
2<<52
−9
5<8−8
11−8
>
2
22
.for ,
,afor  ,
aa
a
a
a
a
εε
εε
ε
η  
Contrary to what happens in the case illustrated in panel i of Figure 1, the right-hand 
part of the inequality 222 2−9> aa )( εη , starting from negative levels for 3= /aε , 
increases with ε  until reaching the value of 85 /  at the point 2= /aε , at which entry is 
no more a problem for the incumbent. This is explained by the fact that under limit pricing, 
while ADΔ  increases with ε  as under Cournot competition, EADπ  is null for all ε . It 
follows that 3<<5 // aa ε , or 2<<5 // aa ε  together with 85> /η , are sufficient 
conditions for inequality (9) to be fulfilled (see the shaded zone in Figure 1, panel ii). In 
these intervals, expected deadweight losses associated with no duplication are so small, or 
duplication is so attractive, that a strong trade secret protection which allows to save 
duplication expenses turns out to be beneficial for society. 
                                                 
12 The incumbent’s profit flow under asymmetric-cost Cournot duopoly is given by 9+ 2 /)( εa . 
Comparing this value with the profit flow under limit pricing, )( εε −a , it follows that limit pricing 
turns out to be a strictly superior alternative for the incumbent if and only if 0<+7−10 22 aaεε , 
which implies 2<<5 // aa ε . 
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• Stackelberg competition. Suppose again 2=< /aPMε . Under Stackelberg competition, 
with firm I  being the quantity leader, firm E  maximizes its profit flow treating firm s'I  
output as given. In turn, firm I  maximizes its profit anticipating firm s'E  reaction. The 
equilibrium firm s'E  quantities and market prices are 
4=
aq ESD ,   ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ 04
3−= ,max εaq EAD ,   4=
aPSD ,   ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
34
+= aaPAD ,min ε  . 
Then, condition (9) becomes  
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
18
7
18−12
23−10> ,max ε
εη
a
a . 
As under Cournot competition, there exists a level of η  below which inequality (9) 
cannot be fulfilled. Since for 3≥ /aε  firm s'E  output is zero, this level is now 187= /η . 
As ε  decreases in the interval 3<<0 /aε , the ratio )/()( εε 18−1223−10 aa  increases, 
until reaching the value 65 /  at 0=ε . Thus, condition (9) turns out to be more likely 
fulfilled under Stackelberg than under Cournot competition (see the shaded zone in Figure 
2). The reason for this is that in the ideal passage from Cournot to Stackelberg competition, 
Figura 2. Condition (9) under Stackelberg competition 
3
a  
η  
1  
ε
6
5  
18
7  
2
a  
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for each 3< /aε  both the differences SDAD Δ−Δ  and EADESD ππ −  decrease, but 
SDAD Δ−Δ  decreases more than EADESD ππ − .13 
• Bertrand competition. If the two firm compete in price, at the equilibrium we have 
0=SDP  and ε=ADP , implying 0== EADESD ππ . Then, instead of the interior solution in 
equation (3), maximization of EΠ  in equation (2) gives the corner solution 0=γ , which 
obviously renders minimization of SC  with respect to γ  a meaningless problem. 
Consequently, condition (9) also becomes meaningless: whatever the pair ),( εη , firm s'E  
investment in duplication will be zero, that is social costs cannot be affected by the scope 
of trade secret law. 
• Collusion. Antitrust notwithstanding, it may be that the two firms collude, in the sense 
that firm I  pays firm E  a fee, negatively related to the cost differential, and firm E  stays 
out of the market. If this is a real possibility, a maximum scope of trade secret law turns 
out to be surely beneficial for society. In fact, since MADSD PPP ==  and 0=EADq , 
condition (9) reduces to 0>η , that is, it is fulfilled for any relevant pair ),( εη .14 
• Incumbent’s post-patent monopoly. Until now we have assumed that 2< /aε . If 
2≥ /aε  and firm E  fails its duplication attempt, firm I  continues to enjoy full monopoly 
power beyond the date of patent expiration. In this case, when the two firms compete à la 
                                                 
13 Under Stackelberg competition there exists no 3< /aε  such that limit pricing is a privately 
superior alternative. This can be viewed by comparing the incumbent’s profit flows under 
asymmetric-cost Stackelberg duopoly, given by 8+ 2 /)( εa , with the profit flow under limit 
pricing, that is )( εε −a . For 2<<3 // aa ε  limit pricing and Stackelberg solutions coincide. 
14 Note that under collusion ESDπ  and EADπ  are given by the fees paid by firm I  in the two 
situations. 
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Cournot if the duplication attempt succeeds, market prices and firm sE '  outputs in 
condition (9) will be 
3=
aq ESD ,   0=EADq ,   3=
aPSD ,   2==
aPP MAD . 
Then, condition (9) reduces to 85> /η . When, instead, the incumbent can act as a 
Stackelberg quantity leader, we have 
4=
aq ESD ,   0=EADq ,   4=
aPSD ,   2==
aPP MAD , 
and condition (9) becomes 23> /η , which cannot hold.15 Summing up, when entry does 
not occur because of a cost differential greater than the monopoly price and η  is constant, 
condition (9) can be fulfilled under potential Cournot competition but not if the incumbent 
firm is able to act as a Stackelberg leader. 
3.3. The Elasticity of Duplication Probability 
We have seen that under Cournot competition a necessary condition for inequality (9) 
to hold is 6250=85> ./η . Likewise, under Stackelberg competition inequality (9) cannot 
be fulfilled if η  does not exceed the value 3880=87 ./ . As there is no empirical evidence 
on the value of η  −which measures the elasticity of individual probability of duplication 
success with respect to the individual expense for duplication− the only thing we can say is 
that likely it varies greatly according to the innovation type, in the same way as the 
elasticity of the supply of inventions −which can be viewed as the elasticity of the 
aggregate probability of invention success, empirically proxied by the number of patent 
applications, to aggregate research expenses− appears to vary greatly across sectors and 
                                                 
15 See footnote 11 above. 
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over time (see Denicolò, 2007, and the literature cited therein).16 Since something similar 
seems to hold for the cost differential ε , the only conclusion we can sensibly drawn is that 
there may exist particular market situations where a negative (positive) effect on social 
welfare of a reduction (an increase) in the scope of trade secret law cannot be excluded, 
despite the patent-secret holder is over-rewarded. Obviously, at the present no policy 
implication can be deducted, either for the aggregate or for specific sectors. 
4. Conclusion 
We presented a simple model in which a producer innovator owns a proprietary 
product protected by a mixture of patent and trade secret. An entrant tries to duplicate the 
secret part of the incumbent’s technology, with a probability of success depending on the 
amount of resources devoted to this aim and on the quantity of usable knowledge spilled 
out of the incumbent firm, which in turn depends on the scope of trade secret law. At the 
patent expiration date, the competitor will enter the market at the same production cost as 
the incumbent if duplication is successful, or higher costs if the duplication attempt fails. 
We showed that in this context, under some conditions a broad scope of trade secret law is 
socially beneficial despite the innovator is over-rewarded. 
For example, in a linear Cournot duopoly a strong trade secret protection turns out to 
be socially beneficial when the secret part of technology is rather relevant in terms of 
production costs and the probability of duplication success is sufficiently elastic with 
respect to the expenses for duplication This result holds for a wider constellation of 
parameters when the incumbent firm can act as a Stackelberg leader or adopts a limit 
pricing strategy or colludes with the entrant. In any case, a strong trade secret protection 
                                                 
16 Available estimates of the elasticity of the supply of inventions range from about 0.3 to about 1, 
depending on data sets and estimation methods. This great variability of estimates just suggests that 
the true elasticity may vary across sectors and over time. 
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may be collectively efficient in that it allows society to save on duplication costs that 
would otherwise be borne by the entrant firm: such saving may be sufficient to more than 
compensate the relatively high expected present value of dead-weight losses associated 
with a low probability that the duplication attempt is successful. 
Appendix 
Differentiating equation (5) with respect to θ  we have 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ++Δ−Δ−−1= )()(')( γθθ
γγθθ
γ
θ gd
dg
d
d
r
T
d
dSC SDAD . 
By using equation (4) we can eliminate θγ dd / . Then, rearranging terms the above 
derivative becomes 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−Δ−Δ−1= 2 )('')())('()('
)(''
γγγγθγθ ggggrg
T
d
dSC SDAD . 
At this point it is easy to verify that θddSC /  turns out to be negative if and only if 
θγ
γγγ
rg
ggg SDAD Δ−Δ>+2
)('
)('')())('( , 
that is, by using equation (3), if and only if 
E
AD
E
SD
SDAD
g
ggg
ππγ
γγγ
−
Δ−Δ>− 2
2
))('(
)('')())('( , 
which is inequality (7) in the proof of Proposition 1. 
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